Wednesday, October 7, 2015

Russian aviation has prepared Assad army base for the offensive – Sight

The Ministry of Defence said the first week of the counterterrorist operation in Syria is extremely spectacular finale – missile attack ships of the Caspian Flotilla. Interim results of operations reported to the president, Sergei Shoigu, and the results are really there. You can even imagine what will be the next steps of the Russian groups in Syria.

There is reason to believe that the report Shoigu Vladimir Putin at the end of the first week of the Russian operation in Syria was not only a unique missile attacks produced Navy ships. He must have regard to the general results of weeks of fighting – the first stage of the Russian operation in Syria. Let’s try to summarize these results and we are.

«Problems that occur at the moment the Russian command, sharply»

Most of the air strikes came in the province of Homs and Idlib, where the infrastructure has been destroyed by the opposition of different political and religious orientation. Mostly destroyed strong points, supply bases and training camps along two strategic roads: Homs – Hama – Aleppo (M5) and running parallel to the track 56 to the town of Jisr – key transport point region. In addition to strategic sites and supply system in the plain of al-Ghar were destroyed position group “Tadzhamu Aziz” – the only one in this area, which had a US anti-tank TOW. They certainly outdated, but against the same, to put it mildly, not very modern tanks of government forces could be quite effective. At the same time strikes at the headquarters of the LIH in the depths of the desert, including in the “capital” of Islamists around the city of Raqqa and Deir az-Zaur. That’s where the cruise missiles were aimed Caspian Flotilla.

Assuming that the first phase of the operation was completed just the 7th, then today the operational pattern of military action in Syria is.

A week bombing prepared base for the ground offensive from the area of ​​Homs and Hama in the north in the direction blocked by militants as the LIH, and other groups of Aleppo. The road from Homs to Hama was cut enclave of opposition fighters in air strikes that have suffered serious losses and almost lost the fighting capacity. All this week the government opposition forces did not show at all any military activity in the region, and not by the new tactics of resistance to Russian air strikes. This creates favorable conditions for the restoration of posts Hama. And then – to advance in the direction of Aleppo and Idlib. In fact, the whole week of the bombing was a preparation for the onset of the government army for the purpose of deblokady Aleppo on the highway M5 and create a solid front (the destruction of the enclave from Homs by government forces in the rear). Now it is the “patchwork” in the rear of government troops without full control of strategic roads too sprays strength to be able to plan the kind of concentrated approach even at any one site.

October 7, government forces gradually focused precisely on this direction, even to the detriment of others. As a result, on October 4-5, the opposition turned to the local counter-offensive on a completely different part of the front – in the Golan Heights and with the fighting took several heights at Tal al-Ahmar, east of Quneitra. This is a local, but significant success. The government army lost two old tanks and a gun since the war with Israel, but it is clear that the strength is not enough to simultaneously hold a “intermingled” front against the motley but effective enough (in a local rather than a strategic sense) groups. Russian aircraft only once “answer” on militant positions in the Golan Heights, which, strictly speaking, and stopped the attack. But the operation in this area requires a close relationship with Israel, as the fighting is in the vicinity of its borders. There is every reason to believe that between Moscow and Tel Aviv are now quite established a strong link not only to avoid useless incidents and accurately verify the target. And the establishment of 7 October a direct link between the defense ministries of Russia and Turkey certainly will prevent raskoordinatsii actions in northern Syria.

«The ball is” now the government army. Announced on Wednesday, just a massive offensive in the north must show, first, as she still is efficient and, secondly, enough already in Syria, the Russian group to conduct such “preparatory work”. Already it is clear that at a time to organize several offensives Damascus is not capable. In addition, there are serious constraints faced by the Russian aviation in other parts of the front, except north. And if the Golan Heights still need only establish relations with Israel, and Idlib – the Turks, the eastern suburbs of Damascus, the Russian aviation required a different level of targeting. Yes, there are practically no civilians and residential areas in ruins, but the arms, which are now used in the north, there will be either insufficient or they are not fully effective. The fighting there go almost hand to hand, a lot of bunkers, special underground passages, to destroy which require more precise location targeting and other ammunition.



To aspire to the creators of “Islamic State»

In any case, now in a new phase of the operation, the Russian aircraft are likely to go to the front support of the offensive of the government troops, not forgetting about the strategic strikes against targets in the depth of the front. As expected, we actually do not have much LIH strategic targets that would require some kind of monstrous amount of sorties. US Air Force showed something about 4 thousand sorties on objects LIH with chronically weak result. The system LIH so arranged that did not require her to spend a lot of manpower and resources.

Another thing – those groups that have the right kinds of US weapons, including anti-tank. Their infrastructure is much more reminiscent of real systematic front-line system, not guerilla warfare Bedouin LIH. A concrete example: the US group fostered “Tadzhamu Azaz,” the defeat of the Russian aircraft which has caused such a strong reaction in Washington. It’s also a psychological aspect: in addition to the lost investment suddenly clearly emerged that it prepared a special program group was not able to resist.

Evaluation of the combat capability of the government army has led some English-speaking commentators to suggest that Moscow would be forced to ” to organize the flow of volunteers “, which could increase its capacity. This idea is consistently moving most of the major media and news agencies in the information war. But the armed forces of the Russian Federation is involved in the technological aspect of the fighting in Syria and the available land units are intended solely for the protection and enforcement of air and naval bases. There are no preconditions in order to “strengthen the volunteers’ Syrian army. It needs only to modern technology, but not in others. And the strategic initiative passed into the hands of Damascus. And the staff and instructors can not be attributed to the category of “volunteers”.

The controversial question remains about the timing of further operations. If everything depends on the speed of advance of government forces, but now it is absolutely impossible to predict. But just a few days (if Damascus did go on the offensive in the north) can be with some error to determine what has and in what time frame required. Simply put, the next stage of the participation of Russian forces in the fighting in Syria is partly observant. You must define including the effectiveness of the bombing of the week “on the ground” – to see the results not through satellite or drone, and the eyes, hands touch. In general, the list of tasks that arise at the moment the Russian command, increases dramatically. A connection with the operation of the fleet is also required to evaluate and how effective coordination of the armed forces in actual combat conditions. This is the main group in the Mediterranean Sea in the operation involved only passively (jamming, communication, coordination).

In general, it is clear that a strategic action plan of the Russian forces in Syria and around it formed not around an abstract idea to “take everything bomb”, as until recently liked to do our Western partners, and working out a specific offensive operation in communications with government troops. It is much more efficient than chasing attack aircraft at $ 50 million for the desert rusty “Toyota” with a machine gun.

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